

CPYRGHT

UNGEHEUERLICHES ZEUGNIS IMPERIALISMUS

Berlin. „Neues Deutschland“ ist in der Lage, heute unserem Volke und der Weltöffentlichkeit den authentischen Text eines geheimen Schreibens zur Kenntnis zu bringen, das der Erbe des größten amerikanischen Öltrusts, Standard Oil Corporation, Nelson A. Rockefeller, im Januar 1956 an den Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika, Dwight D. Eisenhower, gerichtet hat. Der Text, der uns in englischer Originalfassung und in vollem Wortlaut vorliegt, stammt aus einer unbedingt zuverlässigen Quelle.

Der amerikanische Ölmilliardär Rockefeller gibt in diesem Brief dem Präsidenten der USA Empfehlungen, wie die unabhängigen Völkern der ganzen Welt sowie die Kolonien der alten Kolonialmächte, Großbritannien, Frankreich, Portugal, Belgien und Holland über „Hilfe“, wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeit, politische Abhängigkeit, Abhängigkeit durch Militärpakte unter amerikanische Kontrolle gebracht werden sollen. Kriege für amerikanische Interessen gestürzt werden sollen.

Rockefeller legt in dem Geheimdokument dar, wie dieses Recht in Westeuropa mit Hilfe des Marshallplans „unter Anwendung von Druck“ zur Schaffung des NATO-Kriegspaktes geführt worden ist. Die offenerzogene Schilderung des amerikanischen Herrschers, daß das amerikanische Außenministerium unter der Leitung von John Foster Dulles mit Hilfe des SEATO-Paktes beabsichtigt, einen Krieg gegen die Volksrepublik China zu provozieren.

Das Dokument enthüllt die Herrschaft des amerikanischen Imperialismus im Iran. Dazu bemerkt Rockefeller: „Gegenwärtig wagt der Schah noch nicht einmal, irgendwelche Veränderungen in seinem Kabinett durchzuführen, ohne unseren Botschafter zu konsultieren.“

Als Politik gegenüber Ägypten empfiehlt Rockefeller, dem Land die amerikanische „Hilfe“ bei der Durchführung solcher Bauvorhaben anzubieten, die seine Kräfte übersteigen und es dadurch in amerikanische Abhängigkeit zu bringen. Rockefeller fährt fort: „Ich erachte es als eine gute Art der Zusammenarbeit auf andere Länder auszudehnen.“ In der Türkei, die bereits zuverlässige „antikommunistische“ Maßnahmen ergriffen haben, sollen bei der Kreditgebung nach dem Prinzip der „geangelten Fische“ vorgegangen werden: „Der geangelte Fisch braucht keinen Köder.“

In den Kolonien der alten Kolonialmächte sollen die nationalen

My dear Mr. President,
I am reluctant to revert to that lengthy and tiresome discussion which took place in Camp David in connection with my proposal regarding a bolder program of aid to under-developed countries. However, recent political developments have shown that our discussion was not a sterile one and that the time has now come when I should state some points that have occurred to me which though they do not pretend to be original may all the same be of some help in approaching one of the most important problems of our foreign policy.
First of all I would like to express my deep satisfaction with the new Bill increasing the allocation for aid to underdeveloped countries. If I am not mistaken the Bill obtained your approval following Sir Anthony Eden's visit to Washington. The Bill was well timed, particularly in the light of Ambassador Cooper's recent reports emphasizing the catastrophic drop in American prestige in India especially after Mr. Dulles' statement that Portugal should keep Goa.
I am sorry to have to point out that my arguments in favour of expanding our economic measures were misinterpreted. I have not, and never have had, any fundamental differences with the Administration as regards the general line of our foreign policy. I appreciate as much as anybody does the importance of military alliances, but I believe that they call for an approach different from that of the State Department so far. We should not shut our eyes to the fact that military alliances are becoming increasingly unpopular.

Ausschnitt aus dem vertraulichen Schreiben Rockefeller an Eisenhower

Bonn fürchtet Wiedervereinigungsprogramm der SED

Bonn (ND). In zunehmendem Maße wird in westdeutschen bürgerlichen und adenauer-treuen Zeitungen gefordert, im Wahlkampf nicht die Frage der Wiedervereinigung zu behandeln. Das Stichwort für die CDU-Zeitungen gab das Klerus-Blatt „Christ und Welt“ am 9. Februar. In einem ausführlichen Kommentar zu den Deutschlandvorschlägen des Zentralkomitees der SED verlangt es

gramm für die Sicherung einer friedlichen Zukunft Deutschlands und die demokratische Wiedervereinigung besitzt. Das ist inzwischen auch vom Ausland her bestätigt worden, nicht zuletzt durch die Botschaft Bulgariens an Adenauer. Gerade durch die Konfrontierung des Programms der SED mit der zur gleichen Zeit im Bundestag vorgetragenen aggressiven Konzeption der westdeutschen Parteien

Offensive gegen Militarismus

Berlin (ND). Das Präsidium des Nationalrats der Nationalen Front führte am 13. Februar unter Vorsitz von Prof. Dr. Dr. Correns eine Beratung über die Lage in Deutschland und die Aufgaben der Nationalen Front durch. Prof. Al-

einleitenden Referat grundsätzliche Ausführungen des Prof. Dr. Correns

Loch, Erich Mückenberger, Wilhelm Koenen, Karl Namokel und Dr. Dr. Gericke das Wort ergriffen.

Im regen Meinungsaustausch ergab sich die einmütige Auffassung, daß die durch die 30. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED unterbreiteten Vorschläge zum Kampf

kratischen organisati aller Sch der Deut publik, d gabe all stärker hung a guten Besette

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 1. embrace every part of the world and also "total" i.e. include political, psychological, economic, military and special methods integrated into one whole. In other words the task is to hitch all our horses in a single team. To illustrate my point of view better I want to attempt some analysis - even if it is a superficial one - of some aspects of our foreign policy as it has been conducted in Europe and Asia.

In Europe we started with economic aid. It is quite possible that without the Marshall Plan we would have found it much more difficult to form NATO. What in fact happened in this case was that a coordinated foreign policy, using every kind of pressure, resulted in the creation of what we hoped was a solid military union. Even critics within NATO itself say that it suffers from undue emphasis on the military aspects at the expense of the economic factors which played such a big role in its formation.

In Asia our efforts were far less successful. The principal reason for this can, I believe, be clearly stated: the conception of force was too nakedly shown, too much stress was laid on the military side while we largely ignored the importance of preliminary economic preparation for the alliances we wished to make.

This underestimation of the vital economic aspects on the part of the State Department has led to the creation of SEATO and the Baghdad pact on a foundation of sand. And I would prefer to see the sand cemented. The American tradition has been that "the flag follows trade". In spite of this wise tradition all our energy was directed to building up the military side of SEATO. It is hardly plausible, however, that the members of SEATO would want to be involved in a war against communist China, with the US backing Chiang Kai-shek. Yet this apparently was the State Department's calculation.

2. In order to strengthen and, if possible, to broaden these alliances we must draw up a program of economic development extensive enough for us to have in Asia, Africa and other underdeveloped areas a political and military influence as great or greater than that we obtained through the Marshall Plan in Europe. That is why the main flow of our economic allocation for underdeveloped countries should be channelled through bodies set up to serve our military alliances. This should serve to make the alliances themselves more attractive. If necessary, certain changes in the form of these alliances should be considered.

In other words, wherever possible we should emphasize the economic aspects of our alliances. We should widely and wisely make use of economic aid to those countries which we intend to draw into alliance with us, but we should do it more flexibly and carefully than hitherto. In the past we have sometimes tied up the provision of economic aid with demands to join one or other of our alliances in such a crude manner that many potential allies were alienated. It is necessary for us to act carefully and patiently, and in the early stages confine ourselves to securing very modest political concessions in exchange for our economic aid (in some exceptional cases - even without any concessions in return.) The way will then be open to us, but at a later stage, to step up both our political price and our military demands.

You seemed to be ruled by these considerations when you agreed to offer economic aid to Egypt to help it with the construction of the Aswan Dam. If the Nasser Government accepts this aid a situation will be created in which Egypt will inevitably become bogged down in over-ambitious construction and will need our support for a long period of time. I think it logical to extend this type of co-operation to other countries. And in particular never to forget the theory of cumulative rather than immediate political demands on which it is based.

3. In line with this I suggest that those countries to which economic aid is to be extended, should be divided into three groups, different methods and forms of economic co-operation being applied to each of these groups.

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First of all, we should pick out the countries with anti-communist Governments friendly to us, which are already bound to the U.S. through stable long-term military agreements. In this case Governmental subsidies and credits may take the form mainly of military appropriations. The hooked fish needs no bait. Here I agree with the State Department, that the allotment of extensive economic aid, say, to Turkey, might under certain circumstances bring results exactly the opposite of those intended, that is, strengthen its tendency to independence and to weakening its existing military alliances. Such countries may be

is a nationalism so strong as to escape not only from the control of the old colonial powers but also from our own control.

Extensive economic aid to all three groups of countries should always be presented as the expression of a sincere and disinterested desire on the part of the US to help and cooperate with them. We cannot afford to economise in ramming home by every propaganda means available to us the disinterested nature of US policy as regards aid to underdeveloped countries. We do not economise on our anti-communist work. Meanwhile our investors, our technical experts, and other specialists should make it their business to penetrate every branch of the national economy of backward countries, and to develop them with due respect for our own interests and encouraging the national ambitions of those native businessmen whose political loyalty is not in doubt.

It seems to me that provided all these recommendations are carried out the result should be not only to strengthen the international position of the US as a whole but would also considerably facilitate the fulfillment of any military tasks that may confront us in the future by strengthening existing military arrangements and breathing new life into them.

I would not have written this letter and I certainly would not have written at such length, if I had not been confident of your sympathy with the ideas expressed here, and if I did not hope that these ideas would help us in shaping our policy along sound lines.